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The Solution 
Mutahhari's solution to the problem of evil in Divine justice follows 
Neoplatonic lines a- dc, 	the , vriii-Th-century M.; Fm philosopher Ibn 
Sina, also known 	 a. 	 • ), and the s,.:\ 	 Shi 
sage Mulla Stidra 	 s :gin 
with the cause iind 	ct] to tile e 	.y proceed 	to ftc  
ilul the other 	 It is not fundamentally man,' 	looking first I. the 
world at-cl s.. 	 C good and the evil in it in ord‘ir to make a judgment 
about G..t r 
	
iii 	and justice --- Mutahhari says that this approach leads to 
ii is rather beginning with the conviction that God 
is goo, 	an] he. to ti fin and then exphiaing how Go if.- production of 
bu'- his rut 	qlbstantial works are philosophical and tl) 	Amor th,isc 
wnhinc 	'. lutahhari's 	dusti, 	hik..h is an 1.0 	 h tc.inslation of ha  
1973 .;:c 	edition of his T2rsian boot.' 	 - 	heading at the iop 
of page 	la I ■iiiine Justie,•tin.lares. "Problem Solved." The probLim 	 
Mutahhari 	solved is the philosophical problem of evil: if God 
just, and all-powerful, then why is there evil? This article w 
import of Mutahhari's confident claim to have solved the problem of ;v11. The 
first part of the articl,_ 	ill trace the contours of Mutahhari's solution, and the 
second part. will coul. 	Mutahhari's argument within his socio-political 
and intellectual cont.: 	This will show how Mutahhari brings an esoteric 
medieval Islamic philosophical tradition to bear in a modern milieu for the 
sake of Islamic revival. 
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ely a 'shadow' 	God 	is all-beauty. The shadow of the beautiful 
I mist naturally also be hcautiful, They also argue that evil, in 	-, is non- 
existing and is accidental- (p. 93, cf, pp. 48-49, 94-95). 
Mutahhari fields a cornm,.:11 protest against this theodicy of optimism. 
Whatever the philosophers mic.in. sa,' about the world being perfect, there is 
still a substantial amount of di Lierence, discrimination, and evil in the world. 
Some things are ugly and others beautiful. Some things are perfect and others 
(IA.:Jive. There are angels, humans, animals, and inanimate objects. Why 
c not all things been created alike? Why must some suffer while others 
prosper (pp. 94-99)? 
According to Mutahhari, this protcsi derives from an inadequate 
understanding of the necessary causal character of the universe. The world is 
not just a collection of events and created objects that God happens to arrange 
in a particular order with no inherent relations between them. That would he 
the occasionalism and voluntarism of the Ash 'ari Kalam theologians found 
especially in Sunni Islam. Rather, there are essential causal relations between 
events and objects, which means that they cannot be separated out and abstracted 
from their requisite conditions and relations. Mutahhari gives the example of 
the world is ii best possible and hoc,. 	it is 	is clv nc, a 	 To quote 
Nlutahhari: "Ifhe philosopher,1 world is at ;.fi 	God. It is 
Theological Review 
164 1 	 165 
Hoover: Murtaza Mutahhari's Solution to the Problem of Evil 
the number five. The number five has no meaning unless it is set in relation to 
the other numbers and located between four and six, The number five could 
not be set in the place of the number seven arbitrarily. That Would not signify 
anything. Likewise, it make )z 	to abstract particular human beings from 
their times and places and 	 lfting at other times and pl,!...es. God's 
will to create human beings is ins,:T.;ivabb..: from the contexts. ) 	',-ta ions, 
and the relations that make their 1 `,2s possible. 1\4 utahhari 	 well 
that all things are ultimately traceable vertically up the causal 	to God's 
single will to create. Flue. Mutahhari invokes the Qur'an, "Our command is 
but a single [‘vordi" (]. 54:50), and he adopts the Avicennan principle "From 
the One emanates only one" (a/-w(Viid 	ya,ycluru 117'1171M 	(11-1140) (p. 
103), that is, from God emanates only one single thing. 'Mutahhari does not 
fully explain why this principle "from one only one" is important in Dim 
Justice, but its intention is to preserve God's absolute unity. If two or more 
things were to emanate directly from God, this would entail composition in 
God's essence. Multiplicity then arises not from God directly but from that. 
first singular emanation and the causal chain that extends downward from it to 
constitute the entirety of the world in a necessary causal order. Put differently, 
God wills the entire world order with a single will or act that is the first link in 
the world's hierarchical causal chain (pp. 99-)04, 106-13). 
In this light, Mutahhari observes, the difference that we find in the world is 
not something imposed by an agent. It is rather the function of the capacities 
of things themselves. Mutahhari makes this point with the 'following example. 
Imagine that we -fill two ten liter containers with water, one full and the other 
half full. In this case, one container holds ten liters while the other container 
holds five liters because we have discriminated between the two containers. 
Then, imagine that we fill a ten liter container with water to overflowing and 
a five liter container to overflowing. Now, the difference in volumes of water 
in the two containers derives from the capacities of the containers themselves 
and not from an act of discrimination. This leads Mutahhari to articulate what 
he calls "the secret of differences": "The differences between beings are innate  
and essential and a necessity of the system of causes and effects" (p. 104-6, 
quote p. 106, cf. p. 60. Everything has its proper and known place, as it says 
in the Qur 'an, "There is none among us but has a known place" (Q. 37:164) 
(p. 112). There thus can be no complaint against God l'or creating some things 
perfect and others defective, for everything is given existence according to its 
capacity. Mutahhari writes, "Divine mercy fills every container to the extent of 
its capacity" (pp. 151-54, quote p. 153). 
This vision of the world as a necessary causal chain in which things are 
actualized only according to their capacities might sti..2.),.1).‘st a fatalistic moral 
outlook. However, Mutahhari nips this thou)..:ht 	1 bud with an additional 
law that he says God lois written into creation: God only helps those who 
help themselves. In the words of the Qur 'an, "Indeed God does not change 
a people's lot, unless they change what is in their souls" (Q. |3;\|}(p. 117), 
Mutahhari further asserts that human acts cannot occur without human will and 
choice: "Freedom to choose is an inseparable part of the human essence" (p. 
124). Muttahari spends little time in the book Divine Justice reconciling this 
assertion of human free choice with a world of causal necessity, and he refers 
readers to his book Man and His Destiny for further discussion. However, it is 
important to clarify that the kind of human freedom that Mutahhari is invoking 
here is probably not libertarian. This is not a matter of humans making choices 
independently of external causal constraints. It is rather a compatibilist 
freedom in which human choice is held together with the determinism of 
the causal chain created by God. Put differently, God creates human choices 
through necessitating causes. 
Flaying explained the source of difference in the world, Mutahhari turns 
more directly in his book Divine ,Justice to the character of evil. He first 
rejects a metaphysical dualism of good and evil by claiming that pure evil 
does not exist. It has no creator, and thus God cannot be blamed for it. From 
one perspective things in the world are indeed deemed good or evil, but from 
another perspective, "there is no evil in the order of creation; what exists is 
good, and the existing order is the best order. Nothing more beautiful than 
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what exist; 1•. 	(p. 129), Evil is then the lack of What should be. Evils 
are the imperr'H ons and deficiencies that plagna the world. Blindness, for 
example, is the absence of sight, and it is nothinl., in its own right, Similarly, 
ignorance is the lack of kno•,■1,-, 	, ad it FL.. 	se has no e \r.i, tenee. of its 
own. Nlinahhari continues with 	 th.H evils that hai p 	o have 
real 	 are in fact only I ti C 
	 not 
evil to another. A wog t 	 tor a sheep, 
and snake poison might be had for humans but not for the snake a 
animals. On Mutahhari's reading, tIc world is not possible withow 
evils, and the 	 ptr imperfections do not 
even though God's iti,tiC..‘ 	 rcnim a. ilafcic'ies such as 
ignorance and illness (pp. I '7-11 ). 
Mutahhari also elaborates various ways in which evils are actually good. 
Metaphysically, the world is a system, and ,any alteration of its fundamental 
structure would be a change for the 	"..lutahhari writes, "Valleys 
and mountains, les :1 and unlevel places, (1:11-1(nesses and lights, pains and 
pleasures, successes and failures, are all necessary" to maintain the world's 
balance (p. 146). Similarly, ugliness is needed to manifest bc;inty (pp. 147-48), 
and afflictions and calamities are needed for the developnat of happiness 
and refinement of character (pp, 154-66). Opposites and counict ar(.• 
to the order of creation and the manifestation of God's blessing and gra,:e 
and Mutahhari accentuates this point by quoting Mulla Sadra, "If not fi , r tit 
conflict, the eternal grace of the Benevolent Origin [God] would not 
(pp. 1.71-78, quote p. 173). 
Contextualizing the Solution 
With Mutahhari's solution to the problem of evil now fully in view, we can 
turn to some observations on the character and context of his work. The book 
Divine Justice is part of Mutahhari's project to articulate Islam afresh in his 
own socio-political and cultural milieu, He writes in the introduction to the 
1973 second edition, "My sole purpose [for more than twenty years] has been  
to respond to and resolve the questions and problems that have been posed 
renarding Islamic issues in our time" (p. 2). He explams that Dii tie' Ito  
1),..an as a 	 .cches for the Husayniy} 	woltute ,!,•! 
	
aLa up with me many 	 the 
helped found the lrshad 1.htitut, in I 9i3 to aurture 
. among intellectuals and educated young people in Iran.' 
a prodit,i of this context, Divine Justice and Mutahhari's other writings 
of the time fit neither into the traditional scholarship of Qom nor the secular 
scholarship of the modem university. They constitute a bridge bets,:cen the 
two, or rather an apologetic for Islam among the modern intelh ,..!ernsia 2nd 
professional classes.' This apologetic character of Mutahhari's Dii Iii Jot,  
manifests itself most directly in the fluidity of his writing and the seriousness 
with which he engages his readers. The apologetic character of the book comes 
across in other ways as well. 
For example, at one point in the book, Mutahhari wonders whether he 
should have taken up modem science or literature rather than his traditional 
Islamic seminary studies, lie acknowledges that modern education might 
have weakened his spiritual and intellectual state, but he reckons that he could 
well have nurtured sufficient piety with some religious reading alongside 
a modem curriculum. What brings Mutahhari to peace with his classical 
Islamic education is the fact that he would never have otherwise learned the 
profundities of Islamic philosophy and especially the principle that from the 
One only one can come. A modern education would never have opened to him 
the door of this Islamic philosophical paradigm (pp. 102-4). 
It then becomes Mutahhari's mission in Divine Justice to popularize the 
riches of that paradigm for a modem educated readership, to commend the 
3 	1:, 	T. I) 
	
llie Pot ilkil 
	
1.1zitithhari: An Ireznian 
l. me Stun, (Tnndon• 	1•,•( 	?no-). 41-19. Mutahhari ra- 
id Institute in 	 Of \ !;.'\‘', \\H. ;!•. other leaders. 
4 	 , • , i1clationA of the 11slamic Revolu- 
/ n, in.1 •:,•• 	 l 
	 1 11 1 1, 150, notes that appeal of Mutah- 
hari's •• - 	- • 	 pp. 213-141. 
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jewels of what \V a s fundamentally an esoteric traditioi -eserved for an chi e to 
a new kind of mass aud1=c.: In earlier centuries, Mutahhari may w,..111, 
accused of re.'!iii:g the s:.cret of destiny to the uncouth multitud...s . 
religiosity could only suffer iron cxposire to the necessary causal my si 	„ 
ci the universe. But Mutahhari iliccd a new kind of multitude, a young, 
earnest, and secularly educated intelligentsia that needed serious answers to 
difficult religious questions ic it were to stay religious at all. Mutahhari stood 
in to supply the need, and he does so in the conviction that the philosophical 
optimism that he espouses is nothing more than a formalized account of the 
trustinL,  piety of the ordinary believer (pp. 91-93). 
It was perhaps inevitable,. however, that Mui,thhari should oversimplify 
the historical record to augment the persuasive pov. er of his apologetic. Wo 
see this clearly in thc introduction to the 1973 edition of Divine ,hrstice where 
Mutahhari builds an argument for his philosophically derived theodicy of 
optimism as uniquely Shi 1 over against the main Sunni schools of Kalam 
theology, the Ash'aris and the Mu 1 tazilis. According to Mutahhari, the 
Mu 1 tazilis emphasized reason, divine justice, divine wisdom, and human 
freedom even to the extreme of positing human beings as creators alongside 
God. To the Ash ',Iris, this violated God's sole prerogative to create, and it 
limited God's power. The Ash °aris reacted by going to the opposite extreme, 
denying that good and evil could be known by reason and emphasizing God's 
power and total freedom to create whatever He so willed without purpose or 
reason. God could in no way be constrained by rational notions of good and 
evil. To the Mu 'tazilis in turn, this Ash 1ari God was unjust and capricious. 
Mutahhari observes that the Mu 'tazilis and the Ash 'aris each had their 
strengths and their weaknesses, but that the real import of the debate was to stir 
minds to think and pave the way for the solution of the Islamic philosophers. 
Additionally, Shi 1 theology, according to Mutahhari, sided largely with the 
Mu 'tazilis but reconceived the basic notions of justice, reason and free will in 
unique ways that are in fact those of the Islamic philosophical tradition deriving 
from tbn Sina (pp. 6-22). Mutahhari's brief history of Islamic theology gives  
little C 	 he fact that parts of the Sunni world adopted an Avicennized 
vision o' 	fi-inch like his Own or to the fact that Shi 'ism also contains 
streL. 	 much closer to Mu 'tazilism than he grants, in figures 
such as 	 •Mufid (d. LIP '1022) and 1 1 llama al-Hilli (d. 726/1325). 
Mutdiiiiari's account d: 	toll a rh..'iorically powerful story that has 
philosophized Shi Ism providing Me solutwu 	or the most profound 
aporias of Islamic theology and nu.motheistic 	 more generally. 
Mutahhari also brings the Shi `i philosophical solution to the problem 
of evil into dialogue with specifically Iranian and modern concerns. 1--hs 
Avicennan and Sadrian approach allows him to take a strong position against 
the Zoroastrian dualism of pre-Islamic Iran. fie states, "Islam alone was able to 
purge this thousand year old heresy from the Iranian mind" (pp. 63-77, quote 
p. 66). The Mu 'tazilis provided a less powerful defense against Zoroastrianism 
because they were accused of dualism themselves. 
Mutahhari's primary modern opponents were Marxism and secularism. 
These were not merely ideological challenges posed from the outside by 
the west. They were found widely among Iranians th ,..misch -:.s, and they 
undermined traditional religious sensibilities. In Divine Justice, .Mutahhari 
zeroes in on modem materialism and the pessimism that he believes it 
engenders. On his analysis, materialistic pessimism leads to lack of faith, loss 
of meaning, and ultimately to suicide (pp. 77-85). As an example. Mutahhari 
cites the Iranian modernist fiction writer Sadiq Hidayat, who committed 
suicide in 1951. 1 lidayat came from the upper echelons of society, and, on 
Mutahhari's aruksis. he had no want of money; the pleasures that he knew 
were of the dirties sort; he had no faith and nothing to work for and live for; 
and he could not appreciate the good gifts of God. Mutahhari forthrightly states 
that lAidayat should have been made to "taste hunger and nakedness" so that 
he would have come to understand the significance of bread and the essentials 
5 	Mutahhari does mention the optimistic dictum of il--Ghazali (cf. 505/1 l 	""There isn't in 
the realm of possibility anything more marvelous than what exists," in Mc body of the hook 
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of life. He adds that the world is better off withoul 	.(ole who corninit 
suicide because they do not have the ability to ta,..c d iiicul 	J1.1 -1prc1.iiii0 
the world's beauty. Ultimately, adversities and trials 
we should be thankful (pp. 169-71, cf. p. 82). For M 	 odicy of 
philosophical optimism provides meaning in the 	 ciiId a quiet 
serenity that God's world is fundamentally gooe ..md beautiful. He w!-ites, 
"The fact that believers and people of faith have calm demeanors and 	r 
of mind is due to their perception of the world as an ordered and puLp, 
whole based on wisdom and knowledge. They do not see it as being si.;! 
chaotic, and without purpose" (p. 78). 
Conclusion 
To conclude, one of the most striking things in a modern context is 
Mutahhari's combination of a best-of-all-possible-worlds philosophical 
optimism with social and political activism. While Mutahhari's Divine Justice 
is at times polemical, it is not excessively ideological. Mutahhari confines 
himself largely to traditional theological questions, and he does very little to 
relate God's justice to various kinds of political justice as we might .find in 
Christian liberation theologies. To the ears of many a modern activist, it might 
sound like Mutahhari's highly rationalizing account of evil would fit nicely 
with political quietism. With evil completely explained and no possibility of 
a world better than this, why bother trying to change it'? However, Mutahhari 
confounds an easy association of philosophical optimism with political 
quietism through powerful rhetoric and his steady conviction that optimism 
provides the spiritual resources necessary to live an active and meaningful 
lione of God's purposes in evil is to deepen our characters and spur us on 
to improve our own lot, then what is best about God's world is that it put us 
human beings in a very difficult situation—between a rock and a hard place 
from which we must try to extricate ourselves. So, to Mutahhari's mind, no 
doubt, the Shi'i philosophical vision of reality provided the school of hard 
knocks required to support the activism and spirit of Islamic revival. 
